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Estimation Using a Bargaining Model
Abstract
This paper proposes a method to estimate relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democ-
racies. Speciﬁcally, our method combines a bargaining model of government formation with max-
imum likelihood estimation. The data required for estimation are who formateurs are, what each
party’s voting weight is, and what ministerial seats each party obtains. We use variation of the
data and the structure of the bargaining model to recover ministerial weights and other parameters.
Additionally, the method can measure the effects of voting weights and formateur advantage. We
apply our proposed method to the case of Japan. Our results statistically show that political players
value pork-related posts (such as the Minister of Construction) more than prestigious ones (such as
the Minister of Foreign Affairs). We also ﬁn dt h a tt h e r ei sas i g n i ﬁcant formateur advantage, while
voting weights do not have a signiﬁcant scale effect. [139 words]
1In parliamentary democracies parties bargain over ministerial seats when a new government is
formed. Although allocations of seats to parties are observable, the number of posts each party
obtains does not tell us how much the party actually gains, because ministerial seats may be of
varying importance. Thus, we need to know the relative weights of ministers to understand how
much each party gains in government formation. In this paper we propose a method to estimate
relative weights of ministerial posts in a parliamentary democracy.
How important is the post of one minister compared with another? Despite the importance of
this question, the literature provides no statistical method for estimating ministerial weights. As An-
solabehere, Snyder, Strauss, and Ting (2003, p.18) put it, “[t]his is a general problem in the study of
coalition government.” Ministerial weights not only reveal the actual gains of parties in government
formationsbut areindicativeof two intrinsic factors in a ministry: policy importance and pork-barrel
spending. A ministry whose policy area is important to political parties may carry a high weight.
Likewise a ministerial post which distributes or strongly inﬂuences pork-barrel spending may also
be highly weighted. Thus, estimated ministerial weights may tell us which ministry are important to
parties.
Other questions we try to answer through statistical estimation are 1) how voting weights trans-
late into gains from allocated seats, i.e. the scale effect of party size, and 2) how large the advantage
of being a formateur is. Does a bigger party gain more than their voting weights out of the gov-
ernment formation process? Does becoming a formateur provide a party with an extra share in the
cabinet formation process? Gamson (1961) presents a hypothesis, often called “Gamson’s Law,”
that the share of cabinet posts for a party is proportional to its relative size in the coalition. This
has been one of the central questions in the empirical literature of government formation. One of
2the innovations in this paper is that we reconsider these questions allowing cabinet posts to have
different levels of importance.
The method we present combines a bargaining model of government formation1 with maximum
likelihood estimation. The approach of combining a formal theory and estimation is often called
structural estimation.2 Compared to reduced-form estimation or simple regression, an advantage of
this approach is that researchers can estimate and interpret the parameters as model primitives of
formal theory. We use variation of the data and the structure of the bargaining model to recover
ministerial weights and other parameters. The data required for estimation are who formateurs
are, what each party’s voting weight is, and what ministerial seats each party obtains, all publicly
observable data resulting from politicians’ behavior. We emphasize that in applying the proposed
method researchers should employ a bargaining game which properly captures institutional and non-
institutional features of government formation.
We then apply the method to the case of Japan. We estimate the model by employing a bargain-
ing game based on the historical stylized facts. Our results statistically show that political players
value pork-related posts (such as the Minister of Construction and the Minister of Transport) more
highly than prestigious ones (such as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice). Our results also
suggest that the scale effect is approximately zero, while formateur advantage is signiﬁcant. This
1The existing literature has two distinctive approaches toward government formation. The ﬁrst approach considers
that the surplus from government formation depends on the cabinet post allocation and coalition (e.g., Austen-Smith and
Banks (1988, 1990) and Laver and Shepsle (1990, 1998). On the other hand, the second approach assumes the surplus
from government formation to be unchanged by cabinet post allocation and parties in the coalition (e.g., Baron (1991,
1993, 1998), Baron and Ferejohn (1989)). Following the second strand of the literature, the method in the present paper
assumes the surplus does not change.
2See Keane and Wolpin (1997) for recent progress in structural estimation in applied microeconomics.
3implies that how much each party obtains in a government formation is almost proportional to its
s i z ef o rn o n - f o r m a t e u rp a r t i e se v e ni na ne xp o s ts e n s e( t h a ti s ,a f t e raﬁrst proposer is decided),
while formateur party gains more than their voting weights. This conﬁrms Gamson’s (1961) earlier
predictions, which have been studied empirically with a strongassumptionthat all cabinet posts have
the same weights such as Browne and Franklin (1973) and Browne and Frendreis (1980).3 Warwick
a n dD r u c k m a n( 2 0 0 1 )e m p l o yt h eranking of importance of ministers reported by Laver and Hunt
(1992)4 to reconsider the empirical relationship between cabinet post allocation and seat shares.
Recently, Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss and Ting (2003) offer a more comprehensive empirical
analysis; theyinvestigatetheaboverelationshipundertwoalternateassumptions(i.e. theassumption
that all cabinet posts are equally valuable, and the one that the relative value of the Prime Minister is
three times higher than those of other ministers). Although their data is taken from European coun-
tries, their result on the scale effect and formateur advantage is similar to ours with the Japanese
data. Parties’ gains are proportional to voting weights for non-formateur parties, and there is sig-
niﬁcant formateur advantage. Note that both Warwick and Druckman (2001) and Ansolabehere,
Snyder, Strauss and Ting (2003) still make an ap r i o r iassumption on ministerial weights by assign-
ing exogenously determined numbers to ministerial weights.
3For overviews of the empirical literature, see Browne and Dreijmanis (1982), Laver and Schoﬁeld (1990), Laver
and Shepsle (1996), Strom (1990) and Warwick (1994).
4Laver and Hunt (1992) measure the ministerial values by surveying major politicians in European democracies.
Similarly, Kato and Laver (1998) survey Japanese political scientists about the ministerial ranking (excluding the Prime
Minister), where the Minister of Finance is judged the most important, followed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Our result reported in this paper does not necessarily contradict Kato and Laver’s (1998) result. This is because they
estimate the “importance” subjectively evaluated by scholars, who are not players in politics, while we estimate the
values of cabinet posts by using only the publicly observable behavioral data.
4Our contributions to the empirics of government formation are threefold. First, we present a
new approach of ﬁnding the weights of ministers from the data of cabinet post allocations. The
second contribution is that we study the scale effect of the voting weights and formateur advantage
on the gain from government formation. Finally, we have constructed the data set on seat shares and
cabinet posts of the Japanese government, while all existing studies uses data of Western European
countries.
This paper is also related to political economics literature on structural estimation of theoretical
models of politics, where there is relatively a small number of papers.5 Merlo (1997) uses a stochas-
tic multilateral bargaining model to study the duration of government formation and government
stability, and the effect of deadline date for such variables. Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003)
extend Merlo’s (1997) approach, and identify the effects of constitutional features on the stability of
governments using data from nine European countries. Our contribution to this literature is that we
deal with the allocation issue in the bargaining model, while Merlo (1997) and Diermeier, Eraslan
and Merlo (2003) have focused on other aspects: when and how coalition is formed.
In the next section, we present a general exposition of our estimation method. We then apply the
method to the case of Japan and discuss the results. This paper ends with concluding remarks.
Estimation Using a Bargaining Model: A General Exposition
Bargaining Model
We consider government formation as a bargaining game  (θ),w h e r eθ is a vector of parameters
of the game such as the time discount factor and voting weights of parties. The set of political parties
is denoted by I ={ 1,..., N}, and they are players of the game  (θ). Players bargain over the surplus
5For analyses of elections see Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) and Coate and Conlin (2002).
5from government formation which is normalized to one.6 An allocation to players is denoted by






i=1 yi(θ), yi(θ) ∈ [0,1] ∀i ∈ I
k
.
Players’ preferences are expressed by the utility function ui(y) = yi, i.e. we assume trans-
ferrable utility. These features of the bargaining game  (θ) are common to standard bargaining
models of government formation such as Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo
(2003) and Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss and Ting (2003). Let the set of parties in the govern-
ment be denoted by Ig ={ 1,...,n}and the remaining parties, which are out of the government, by
Io ={ n + 1,..., N}.We denote an equilibrium allocation by y∗(θ) ={ y∗
i (θ)}N
i=1.
Condition The equilibrium allocation y∗(θ) of the bargaining game  (θ) is unique.
The method we present here does not depend on the equilibrium concept applied to the game
 (θ). Condition 1 requires that the equilibrium concept generates an unique equilibrium allocation.
Note that uniqueness of equilibrium allocation does not necessarily mean uniqueness of equilib-
rium. For example, although the sequential bargaining game by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) can have
a continuum of equilibria in the class of stationary (that is, time and history independent) strategies,
the equilibrium allocation is unique as shown by Eraslan (2002).
One of the parameters in θ whose effect is of particular interest in the literature is the voting
weights of parties.7 For notational convenience we will use the relative voting weights of the parties
in the government8 and denote them by ω = [ω1,...,ωn], where
3n
i=1 ωi = 1 holds. We will mea-
6If the size of the surplus changes across time, we normalize it in such a way that the surplus at the time of allocation
is equal to one. That is, we normalize the surplus so that
3n
i=1 yi(θ) = 1 holds.
7See e.g. Gamson (1961), Browne and Frendreis (1980) and Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss, and Ting (2003).
8We can use the voting weights in the legislature. The reason for using the relative weights among government
parties is for notational simplicity. Our results will not be affected by this.
6sure the effect of voting weights by parameter α of the function h(ω; a) and denote the parameters
in θ other than ω and α by θ .N o w ,y∗
i (θ) can be expressed y∗
i (θ) = y∗
i (θ ,h(ω; α)),w h e r eh(ω; α)
represent the effect of voting weights. Note that we need ω as data.
Another issue of interest in the literature is the formateur advantage. In many models of gov-
ernment formation, a formateur is selected rand o m l yi fn op a r t yh o l d sam a j o r i t yo fs e a t si nt h e
legislature. We can also incorporate this factor into our speciﬁcation by making y∗
i (θ ,h(ω; α))
dependent on the realization of uncertainty. Denote the realization of being a formateur by γ i = 1
and of not being one by γ i = 0. We measure the effect of being a formateur by parameter γ of
the function g(γ; δ) We can then denote the ex post payoff by y∗
i (θ) = y∗
i (θ ,h(ω; α),g(γ; δ)),
where g(γ; δ) expresses the effect of being a formateur. We require the data of γ as well, i.e. the
information on who the formateur is.
Speciﬁcation and Estimation
Allocations we observe in the data are those of ministerial seats. As we will use only the data
of parties in government, we focus on players Ig ={ 1,...,n}.L e tK ≡{ 1,...,k} denote the set of
ministerial posts, and let xi = [xi1,...,xik] ∈{ 0,1}k denote an allocation of cabinet seats to party i,
where xij = 1 means that party i obtained the post of Minister j and xij = 0 otherwise. The relative
weights of ministers to be estimated is β = [β1,...,βk]  ∈ [0,1]k. To keep our argument consistent
with the normalization in  (θ), we normalize the sum of the weights to be one, i.e.
3k
j=1 β j = 1.
Now, xiβ represents the value of ministerial posts partyi obtains. This value, however, can only take
discrete values given β, while y∗
i (θ ,h(ω; α),g(γ; δ)) should possibly take any value in [0,1]. This
is because the surplus over which players bargain should be considered as the “pie,” i.e. we want to
allow any division of the surplus. To do so, we assume that players can make and receive monetary
7side-payments to offset the difference between xiβ and y∗
i (θ ,h(ω; α),g(γ; gd)).I no t h e rw o r d s ,
the role of side-payments is for the parties to “settle” the difference in payoff between the (discrete)
value of allocated posts and the payoff they ought to receive. We denote the net amount of side-
payments received by party i as εi. Then, we have y∗
i (θ ,h(ω; α),g(γ; δ)) ≡ xiβ + εi.T h i s i s
because the gain in the bargaining game must be equal to the gain from ministerial posts and side
payments for any party. Side-payment εi is not observable and is determined exogenously by β and
 (θ). As it seems there is no factor that systematically affects εi across parties and side-payments
are not observable, we treat εi as a random variable drawn from an identical distribution.9
Side-payments across parties, however, are not independently distributed. This is because they
a d du pt oac o n s t a n tv a l u e ,g i v i n g{εi}n
i=1 a correlation of negative one. In order to avoid technical
difﬁculties, we assume that the side payments will add up to 0, i.e. there is no outside fund. Then,
side-payments have to satisfy the budget balance
3n
l=1 εl = 0o r
3
j =i εj =− εi.
Hence, we have only n − 1 degrees of freedom for n draws of εi. A party receives some side-
payment which has a perfect negative correlation with the net side-payment of all the other parties
in the government, while εis are independent among those parties.
We observe a similar feature in our data. The number of seats is ﬁx e di ne a c hg o v e r n m e n t
f o r m a t i o n ,a n de a c hp o s ti sa s s i g n e dt oo n l yo n eparty. This implies that the information on the
allocation of posts contained in the data for n − 1 parties is equal to the information contained in
that of n parties, i.e. the data {xl}n
l=1 has the following property:
3n
l=1 xl = [1,...,1] or
3
j =i xj =
9One might argue that in government formaion political parties give and recieve side-payments strategically. We
believe, however, that the allocation of ministerial seats is of more importance than side-payments in government for-
mation and that “[g]overnment ministries are the most tangible manifestations of policy payoffs to governing parties”
(Browne and Franklin (1973, p.454)).
8[1 − xi1,...,1 − xik].
3n
l=1 xl = [1,...,1].I no t h e rw o r d s ,i n f o r m a t i o no nt h ep o s ta l l o c a t i o no f
one party is always redundant.
Similarly, the sum of the voting weights is ﬁxed at 1, i.e.,
3n
l=1 ωl = 1o r
3n
j =i ωj = 1 − ωi.
We can ﬁnd the voting weights of one party if we know the size of all the other parties. Thus,
we can also ignore the information on the voting weights of one government party because it is
redundant.
Following this reasoning, we ignore the data for one party and use only n −1 equations for each
government formation. This enables us to ignore the correlation among εis. If we use only n − 1
parties for estimation, εis are no longer correlated since they have n − 1d e g r e eo ff r e e d o m . W e
denote the party to be ignored by l.N o w ,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gn − 1 equations for a government
formation: y∗
i (θ ,h(ω; α),g(γ; δ))− xiβ = εi for party i ∈ Ig\{l}.
Finally, we will estimate the model using the maximum likelihood method. As we have argued
above, we have no reason to assume that the distributions of εis are dependent nor non-identical.
Furthermore, we have no reason to assume that side-payments are systematically correlated among
p a r t i e so ra c r o s st i m e . 10 Also, εisc a n n o tt a k ea n yv a l u eo u to f[ −1,1]. Hence, we assume that
εi follows an i.i.d. Generalized Beta distributionw i t hm e a n0a n de s t i m a t et h em o d e lu s i n gt h e
maximum likelihood method.11
We number the name of the government with superscript t ∈{ 1,...,T},w h e r eT is the total
number of governments in the data. The data in government formation t consists of how ministerial
10Remember that the correlation arising from the budget balance is eliminated, as descrived above.
11A Beta distributioin is employed because ε has a ﬁnite support. In fact, as the support is now [−1,1], the Beta
distribution we employ is the one called the Generalized Beta of the ﬁrst kind. For details see McDonald (1984). Our
results are robust for the speciﬁcation with Normal distribution.
9posts are allocated to parties (xt = [xt
1,...,xt
n]) and how voting weights are distributed (ωt =
[ωt
1,...,ωt
n]). Now, the likelihood function can be written as





































As we have (x1,...,xT) and (ω1,...,ωT) as observable data, we can obtain a Maximum Likeli-
hood (ML) estimate by maximizing the log-likelihood function respect to α, β, δ,a n dθ ,g i v e nt h e
data. Standard errors can be obtained by the bootstrap method12 as we demonstrate in the following
application. In the rest of the paper, we provide an application of this methodology.
Application: Japanese Governments, 1958-1993
In this section we apply the method explained above to government formation in Japan during
the period from 1958 to 1993. We have chosen to shed light on government formation in Japanese
democracies, a topic which has not been statistically investigated in the literature. Note, however,
that our method can be applied to other democracies as well, providing extensive possibilities for
future research. First, we consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model of government forma-
tion based on the observations of the stylized facts explained in the Appendix 1. Then, we explain
t h ed a t aw eu s e ,a n dﬁnally estimate the model.
We model the game of government formation as a bargaining model among the factions of the
Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter, the LDP) since the government formation was a process among
12The bootstrap is a method for estimating the distribution of an estimator by resampling the data, and treat them as
if they were the population. For a more explanatory account, see e.g. Horowitz (2001).
10the LDP factions.13 We employ the unanimity rule for agreement following the observations that the
LDP maintained majority, that an LDP faction with a signiﬁcant size obtained cabinet posts, that no
faction have ever left the LDP, and that no vote of no-conﬁdence was vote for by any LDP factions.
We consider this game to be an alternating offer random proposer model. This is because factions
could have rejected the offer and voted for a no-conﬁdence resolution to choose the proposer again
and restart the process.14 The model is an extension of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We generalize
the recognition probability as a function of voting weights of the factions, and employ unanimity as
the agreement rule instead of majority. For all these model assumptions, we arguethe corresponding
stylized facts in Appendix 1.
We assume that factions evaluate posts in an identical way. As we argue in Appendix 1, factions
are understood to have little difference in policy interests. There is also no reason to assume that
some factions value money differently, since they use it in the elections in a very similar way. Hence,
we assume that values of cabinet seats are identical to all the factions.
At this point, it might be worth making explicit that we do not consider possible strategic rela-
tions between one government formation and another. This is because players’ equilibrium payoffs
are uniquely determined in the class of strategies we consider (stationary strategies) as will be ex-
plained in the latter part of this section (Preposition 2). There is no analytical gain to consider a
“repeated game” of government formation because players’ equilibrium payoffs of this extended
game are just the discounted sum of equilibrium payoffs at each stage game under stationary strate-
gies. Note that if we do not conﬁne the class of strategies to stationary ones, then, as Proposition 1
13We conisider a faction in the LDP as a political player. See Appendix 1 for details.
14This has not happened in the history. In our model, this is off the equilibrium-path behavior, i.e. this should not
happen in equilibrium.
11below shows, any reasonable allocation can be an equilibrium even in each stage game of bargain-
ing (and even under subgame perfection), meaning we cannot connect the model prediction to the
data (or we have to connect the inﬁnite possibilities of the real world to one observation, which is
impossible).
The Bargaining Model
This game is a multilateral sequential inﬁnite-horizon bargaining game with random proposers
a n dw i t ha nu n a n i m i t yr u l e .T h r o ughout, we consider a complete information environment. Let the
set of players be deﬁned by N ={ 1,...,n} where n ≥ 2 .W es e eaf a c t i o na sap l a y e r .F a c t i o ni ∈ N
has a relative voting weights(or proportion of seats) ωi ∈ [0,1] where
3n
i=1 ωi = 1. The factions
bargain over the seats of ministers, whose sum of weights are normalized to one.
T h eg a m ep r o c e e d sa sf o l l o w s . I nt h eﬁrst period, a faction i  is randomly recognized as a




of payoff vector y = (y1,..., yn). After observing the offer, factions sequentially respond whether
to accept or reject the offer. We assume that the unanimity agreement is necessary for government
formation; if all the factions have accepted the offer, the offer is implemented as proposed, and a
government is formed. If not, the game goes to the second stage, and faction i (which can coincide






This formulation enables us to test the scale effect of factions. If an estimated α is large, a larger
f a c t i o ni si n c r e a s i n g l ym o r ep r o b a b l et ob er e c o g n i z e da sap r o p o s e r .I fα is equal to zero, it implies
that hi(ω) = ωi, i.e. the probability is exactly proportional to the faction’s voting weight.
12T h ef o l l o w i n gp r o c e d u r ei se x a c t l yt h es a m ea si nt h eﬁrst period, and the game continues until
all the factions accept an offer of allocation v. We assume that factions discount the future with a
common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). If an allocation y is agreed in stage τ, faction i will obtain
δτ−1yi. Otherwise, all factions will have a payoff of 0.
A history is a speciﬁcation of a ﬁnite sequence of the actions taken at each date in the sequence
up to the point. A strategy for faction i is a sequence of actions which speciﬁes what to do at every
history where it must act, and a strategy proﬁle is an n-tuple of strategies, one for each faction. A
strategy proﬁle is subgame perfect i fa n do n l yi fn of a c t i o nc a nm a ke itself strictly better off by
deviating from its strategy at any single date.
Characterization of Equilibria
The model has multiple subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). In a similar class of multilateral bar-
gaining models (see Sutton (1986) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989)), any individually rational payoff
is shown to constitute an SPE outcome for δ close enough to one. Appendix 2 shows that this result
applies to our model with the unanimity rule as well.
Facing this multiplicity of equilibrium and equilibrium payoff, the literature turned its focus on
stationary SPE (SSPE), that is, SPE in the class of stationary strategies. A strategy proﬁle is called
stationary if it does not depend on the current date and past history. Eraslan (2002) recently showed
that we can ﬁnd a unique equilibrium payoff (there can be multiple SSPE though) by focusing on
stationary strategies in a more general model with a q-quota majority agreement. The model here
requires unanimity for agreement. In the following proposition, we obtain the closed form solution
for the unique equilibrium payoffs of the model.
Proposition (Eraslan (2002)) In SSPE, factions agree in the ﬁrst period. The SSPE payoff is







where E denotes an expectation operator. The ex post payoff for the proposer i and non-proposer j
are respectively
y∗














Proof. Replace q-majority in Eraslan’s (2002) proofs by unanimity and make discount factors
equal for all players.
This characterization has a natural and intuitive meaning; a faction which is chosen as a proposer
in the ﬁrst period is making an offer so that any other faction does not make itself better off by
rejecting that offer and going to the next stage. As a result, all the factions agree with that offer in
the ﬁrst period. To put it in another way, the proposer in the ﬁrst stage can make as favorable an
offer to it as possible, keeping other factions from being better off by rejecting the offer.
We use this equilibrium characterization for the estimation of the model in the next section.
The implication of this characterization is as follows. The positive (negative) value of α implies
increasing (decreasing) returns to the scale of the size of a faction, while α = 0 implies constant
returns to scale. The value of δ is low if formateur have an advantage in obtaining seats, while δ
close to 1 implies little formateur advantage. Before turning to the empirical part of the paper, we
make further arguments for employing this model.
Discussion of the Model
14The SSPE of the model gives us further justiﬁcation of employing this model. The ﬁrst feature
is about the timing of the agreement. The model predicts that the agreement is immediate. As
discussed in Appendix 1, the Japanese government formation period was very short (at the longest,
it took only three days after the Prime Minister-designate was selected in the Diet). Compared with
other democracies, the bargaining period is exceptionally short. We can call this “immediate” when
considering the time that is necessary for the Prime Minister-designate to make an offer. Hence,
we can say that the model prediction exactly matches the historical observation that the cabinet
formation had been immediate.
Another feature of the SSPE is that all the players have a positive payoff. This results from the
assumption of unanimity. For example, if we employ majority rule for agreement, there should be a
signiﬁcant number of factions which cannot obtain a cabinet post. This equilibrium characterization
made us to choose unanimity as a decision rule because the stylized facts presented in Appendix 1
shows that any faction of signiﬁcant non-negligible voting weights obtained cabinet seats in most of
the government.
Data
We use Japanese data for the period from 1958 to 1993.15 We collected the data on the numbers
of LDP seats in the lower house, the sizes of factions at the time of cabinet formation, and the
15The LDP was formed in 1955, and maintained majority until 1993 in the House of Representatives (see Section
3). The factions, however, were not clearly deﬁned at the beginning of the LDP history. We are not able to collect
reliable data of how large each faction was and of which faction each member was afﬁliated with during the period
of 1955-1957.(See also Sato and Matsuzaki (1986).) Kohno (1992, p.371) also reports; “During the LDP presidential
election in 1957, these leaders began to form alliances ..., and by the end of 1957 eight factions had emerged as distinct
organizational features of the LDP.”
15allocations of cabinet seats to factions, including the identity of the prime minister’s faction. We
collected this information from Sato and Matsuzaki (1986) and Kitaoka (1995).16 Table 1 presents
the descriptive statistics of the data.
[Table 1 about here]
Forty four cabinets were formed during this period, and the LDP maintained a majority in the
lower house throughout the period. Factions in the LDP changed across time, and the number of
factions ranged between 5 to 12 with the average of 8.4 factions.17 As we use data for each faction
in each government, the total number of equations are 415, though the number of observations is 44.
Figures 1-3 present the main features of our data. Figure 1 depicts the histogram of the relative
size of the factions. Factions bigger than 0.2 are very few, while those smaller than 0.2 are more
prevalent at about the same proportion. Figure 2 shows the histogram of the faction size of the Prime
Minister’s faction. Comparing with the Figure 1, we ﬁnd that they look different. The bigger the
size of a faction, the more likely it will be chosen as a proposer. This assures our model setup which
assumes that the probability to be recognized as a proposer is a function of the faction size.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Figure 3 depicts the relationship between the proportion of cabinet posts (i.e. the number of
cabinet posts one faction obtained out of all the cabinet posts) and the faction size. There seems to be
16We also referred to Asahi Shimbun (various issues), which is one of the leading daily newspapers in Japan, when
information in Sato and Matsuzaki (1986) and Kitaoka (1995) were not consistent or were lacking.
17For the estimation, we treated legislators who did not belong to any faction as an independent faction. The average
number of seats which independent legislators obatained in each government is 0.75. We deﬁne their size by 1/(number
of LDP seats).
16a positive correlation as a whole.18 This, however, looks different if we look into it more carefully.
The relationship is not clear for the faction with Prime Minister posts19.T h i s a l s o c o n ﬁrms our
assumption that cabinet posts have different importance.
[Figure 3 about here]
No signiﬁcant bureaucratic reform was implemented during the data period.20 Numbers of cab-
inet posts are almost constant. Twenty-one cabinet posts were constant throughout this period.
Minor changes occurred in the early 1970’s when three new agencies were created (three posts are
added accordingly), and in 1984 when one agency was closed.21 There was no signiﬁcant change in
the electoral system during the data period.
18Browne and Frendreis (1980) study this relationship for 132 Eurpoean coalitional governments. We ran the same





× Const + 1.147
(0.043)
× RelativeSeatShare
19Dividing the data into factions with the Prime Minister’s post and others, the result of regression is very different.
For the Prime Minister’s faction, the relationship is not very clear as the following high standard errors and low R2





× Const + 0.537
(0.292)
× RelativeSeatShare





× Const + 1.038
(0.038)
× RelativeSeatShare
20The cabinet posts in this paper are different from the current ones due to a signiﬁcant bureaucratic reform in 2001.
21The Director General of Environment Agency (1971), the Director General of the Okinawa Development Agency
(1972), and the Director General of the National Land Agency (1974) are the three posts which were added during this
period. The Director General of the Administration Management Agency is the post that was removed.
17Speciﬁcation of the Model
The multilateral bargaining model presented above speciﬁes the unique SSPE payoff for each
faction (see Proposition 2). As we have already presented the model, we now follow the general ex-
positionwehavepresentedearlier. Preposition2providestheexpressionfor y∗









= xiβ + εi





= xjβ + εj
for non-proposer j ∈ N\{i}. Therefore, each government formation provides us with a system
of n equations as above. As discussed previously, we ignore the data for one faction, and use
only n − 1 equations for each government formation for consistency. This ena b l e su st oi g n o r et h e
correlation among εis. For convenience, we choose the faction of the proposer to be removed from





− xjβ = εj
for any non-proposer factions j ∈ N\{i}.
On this system of n − 1 equations for each government, we have a trivial solution of δ = 0,
β1 = 1a n dβk = 0f o rk ∈ K\{1} if we ignore ε. When we estimate using the above speciﬁcation,
estimations always give values very close to δ = 0, β1 = 1a n dβk = 0.23 This, however, cannot be
22Our results do not depend on the choice of faction we do not use. This is because the data for n − 1f a c t i o nh a v e
exactly the same amount of information as that of n factions for the reasons discussed earlier.
23This is a trivial answer to the system of equations if we ignore ε. The answer is true for any values of ω and X.
18a solution as weights of ministers other than prime minister is 0. We will avoid this trivial solution











Finally, we will estimate the model using the maximum likelihood method. The likelihood
function can be written as24
















































In the actual calculation, we have employed the bootstrapping method. We randomly drew
observations from the original data without replacing the original data for the same number of times
as the original number of observations. We repeated this process 500 times, and used the average as
the point estimates and the standard deviations as the standard errors for the parameters.
Results
Estimates
T h er e s u l ti sp r e s e n t e da sT a b l e2b e l o w . T h er eported standard error is obtained using the
bootstrap method.
[Table 2 about here]
24Now, the Generalized Beta distribution of the ﬁrst kind has support [−1/δ,1/δ] and mean 0.
19T h el a s tc o l u m ni nT a b l e2r e p o r t st h er e s u l tw i t ha nr e s t r i c t i o nt h a tα = 0. T h er e s u l ti sa l m o s t
the same as the one without this restriction. The likelihood decreases only by 0.22. The likelihood
ratio test cannot reject a hypothesis α = 0e v e na t1 %l e v e l . T h i si sa l s oc l e a rf r o mt h er o b u s t
standard error of α reported in Table 2. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no scale
effect of the voting weights.
Discussion
T h ea b o v er e s u l t st e l lu san u m b e ro f important things. First, we ﬁnd that the post of the Prime
Minister has by far the highest value. This should not be a peculiar result. The power of the Prime
Minister results from many factors: 1) Constitutionally, he is the head of the cabinet, and all of the
cabinet decisions need his signature. 2) The budget has to be signed by the Prime Minister before it
is submitted to the legislature. 3) He can also control the legislative process by having the power to
dissolve the legislature. In addition to these and many other factors, this high weight on the Prime
M i n i s t e rm a ya l s or e ﬂect the power to propose a ministerial seat allocation. Although we do not
know how much each of these factors contributes, we are not surprised that the Prime Minister has
the highest value.
The second observation is that the Ministers of Construction and Transport have the next highest
values to the Prime Minister. These are alleged to be “dirty” posts. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth
(1993) mention the Ministry of Construction as having been characterized as “a politically driven
pork wagon” (p.124). There are many other academic as well as journalistic accounts for the claim
that these two posts have strong inﬂuence on pork-barrel projects (see e.g. Woodall (1996)). The
Ministry of Construction is in charge of the construction of dams, bridges and roads. The Ministry
of Transport controls the procurement process of ports, airports, railways, and highways.
20A third point, which is most clearly seen in the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, is that ministerial
weights are not necessarily correlated with the seniority of the appointed politicians.T h eM i n i s t e r s
of Foreign Affairs are reported to be important (see e.g. Kato and Laver (1998)), and posts for a
senior politician (see e.g. Sato and Matsuzaki (1986)). The value to the factions, however, is very
low in our result. Our model focuses on the bargaining among factions and the values of ministers
from the perspective of factions. The factions have politicians of diverse seniority, and our result
tells that the seniority is only one of the factors for the allocation of the cabinet posts.
Fourth, δ = 0.806 implies that there is a signiﬁcant formateur advantage. If δ = 1, there is no
formateur advantage, and parties’ gains are only dependent on their size. However, δ<1i m p l i e s
that the proposer gains more than non-porposers even if their sizes are the same. For example, if a
faction has size 0.2, then in the absence of scale effect, δ = 0.8 implies that being a proposer will
give the faction 0.36, while the gain is 0.16 if the faction is not a proposer.
Finally, α = 0 cannot be statistically rejected at a conventional level. This implies that we cannot
reject the hypothesis that there is no signiﬁcant scale effect of faction sizes when bargaining over
cabinet seats; i.e. cabinet post allocations are proportional to the size of factions. With the estimated
α = 0a n dδ = 0.8, the Gamson hypothesis applies to non-proposer factions, while the proposer
gains more than their size. This result is consistent with Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss and Ting
(2003) though their estimatation results are based on European data with exogenously determined
ministerial weights.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has structurally estimated relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democracies.
Speciﬁcally, we have combined a bargaining model of government formation with maximum likeli-
21hood estimation. The data required for estimation are who formateurs are, what each party’s voting
weightis, andwhatministerialseatseachpartyobtains. Byusing theJapanesedataduringtheperiod
of from 1958 to 1993, we ﬁnd that the Ministers of Construction and Transport, which have been
alleged to have a strong inﬂuence on pork-barrel spending, have high estimated values, while the
estimates for the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice have low weights though they are regarded
as more prestigious ministers. We also ﬁnd that voting weights do not have a signiﬁcant effect on
the returns to scale, i.e. their bargaining power is almost identical to their size. Finally, we observe
an evidence of formateur advantage.
The present paper did not cover European cases. However, our method can easily be applied to
European democracies by employing an appropriate bargaining game. One of the beneﬁts of study-
ing European parliamentary democracies is that one can conduct comparative analysis of ministerial
weights, which may depend on some institutional and non-institutional features of each country.
This and other interesting issues are left for future research.
Appendix 1: Government Formation in Japan, 1958-1993
In this part, we describe institutional and non-institutional features of government formation in
Japan during the period of 1958-1993, which our formal model is based upon.
Japan employs a parliamentary regime with a bicameral legislature. The legislature is called the
Diet, which consists of the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors. In the House of
Representatives, single non-transferable voting (SNTV) in (mostly) three to ﬁve seat districts was
used, while the members of the House of Councilors were chosen by proportional representation
until 1993.25 The Prime Minister is head of the cabinet, and is designated by the legislature. On
25More precisely, in the House of Councilors, until 1980, low-magnitude SNTV was used in the prefectural districts
22designation, the House of Representatives can make a ﬁnal decision if the two Houses disagree for
tendays. Oncedesignated, thePrimeMinister-designatewillselectcabinetmembers; themajorityof
those selected must be legislators. After all the cabinet members are selected by the Prime Minister-
designate, the Emperor will appoint him as the Prime Minister.
A member of the cabinet can be appointed to multiple posts, while each ministerial post can
accommodate only one person. The Cabinet Law (Law No.5 of 1947) limits the maximum number
of cabinet members. As the Prime Minister solely has the authority to appoint members of the
cabinet, he can reshufﬂei t . T h er e s h u f ﬂe process is the same as the formation of a new cabinet.
T h em e m b e r so ft h ec a b i n e tm u s tr e s i g nen masse once the House of Representatives passes a no-
conﬁdence resolution. In such a case, a new Prime Minister-designate will be chosen in the Diet in
the same process as shown above.
Followingfactsduringtheperiodof1958-1993provideuswithsomedetailsoftheactualprocess
of government formation in Japan.
1. The Liberal Democratic Party maintained majority in the House of Representatives,26 and the
Prime Minister-designates were always LDP presidents.
2. No LDP faction voted for a no-conﬁdence resolution after government formation. No no-
conﬁdence resolution was passed in the Diet, except for one.27
along with national SNTV. Before the 1983 election, the prefectural districts were unchanged, but the national SNTV
election was replaced by national closed-list PR.
26The LDP was not in a majority position from 1983 to 1986. It then formed a coalition with the New Liberal Club
(NLC), which was a part of the LDP in substance, and merged with the LDP in 1986. The NLC was formed by a number
of young LDP legislators who left the LDP after a corruption scandal in 1976. It stayed in opposition for six years (the
LDP maintained majority during these six years) before forming a coalition with the LDP in 1983.
27In 1980, the Diet passed the no-conﬁdence resolution with the absence of 69 LDP legislators. However, this was
233. LDP factions played the central role in government formation.
4. No LDP faction left the LDP, and LDP factions of signiﬁcant size obtained cabinet posts in
most of the cabinets.
5. All of the cabinets were formed within three days after a Prime Minister-designate had been
designated.28
First, the LDP maintained a majority in the House of Representatives during the period of 1955-
1993. This implies that the actual process of choosing a Prime Minister was an internal process of
the LDP. The LDP candidates for Prime Minister, who were also the presidents of the LDP,29 always
won the vote of designation. The fact that the Prime Minister-designates were from the LDP and the
fact that no LDP factions voted for a no-conﬁdence resolution imply that the government formations
(not only the choice of Prime Minister) were an internal process in the LDP. Hence, we think that
both the choice of the Prime Minister and the cabinet formation were internal processes in the LDP.
Second, LDP factions have been the primary internal organizational unit of the LDP, and have
played a central role in cabinet formation (see, e.g. Leiserson (1968), Sartori (1976), Kohno (1992)
and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993)). The LDP factions are said to have little difference on their
preferences over policy issues. For example, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, p.77) say “Factions,
in fact, have virtually no role outside of personnel matters. This is because each faction is more or
not related to government formation.
28During the period of 1958-1993, cabinets were formed within two days after the Prime Minister-designates were
selected. One exception is that it took three days when the second Ohira cabinet was formed (November 6 to 9, 1979).
29The only exception took place in 1979, when the LDP had two candidates. Once designated, Prime Minister-
designate Ohira allocated seats to all the factions with the signiﬁcant size, including the ones who voted against him
when he was approved in the diet.
24less a microcosm of the entire party in terms of policy preference and expertise.”30 We observe that
the LDP factions had no signiﬁcant difference in their preference over policy areas.31
In the actual process, the Prime Minister offers a proposal of cabinet posts to all the factions.
Factions respond to the offer by agreeing or by requesting more and/or different seats, and then
the offer is revised. In case factions cannot agree with the revised offers, the factions could ask
for a change of the LDP leadership or leave the LDP, and/or vote for the vote of no-conﬁdence.
Historically, none of these disagreements happened. The President of the LDP has never changed
right after the designation of Prime Minister-designate. During the period of 1958 to 1993, no
faction left the LDP and no vote of no-conﬁdence was ever agreed upon by any LDP factions. We
interpret these facts as follows: the cabinet formation process was under unanimous agreement of
all the factions.32 Another fact is that any faction of signiﬁcant size obtained cabinet seats in most
of the cabinets. This also supports our interpretation that the agreements were unanimous because
non-unanimous agreements should (at least theoretically) always result in no cabinet seats for some
factions.
Historically, no cabinet formation required more than three days. We interpret this as an immedi-
ate agreement for two reasons. First, the Prime Minister-designate will need time to form his offer to
30Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, p.211) also cite an interview with one faction leader of the LDP, who says that
factions are not distinguishable on policy areas.
31Not all the researchers agree with this point. See McCubbins and Thies (1997) for a different view.
32Factions may get frustrated with the cabinet formation. We, however, think that they still agreed upon even though
they may have got frustrated. For example, Fukuda faction thought they were underrepresented in the formation of the
TanakaCabinet in 1972, while they never really tried to form a hostilecoalition nor called for a no-conﬁdenceresolution,
even though they could have succeeded in it to restart the cabinet formation process. (Fukuda faction had 56 seats, and
the opposition had 207 seat. Hence, vote for a no-conﬁdence resolution could have won by 263-228.)
25the factions carefully. Even still, the offer is agreed and the cabinet is formed within a short period of
time. Second, the comparison with another country tells us that the agreement is immediate. Merlo
(1997) provides data for government formation during post-war Italy. Compared with his data, in
which the mean is 4.98 weeks and the maximum eighteen weeks, we interprett h a tt h ea g r e e m e n t
w i t h i nt h r e ed a y si si m m e d i a t e .
Appendix 2: Any Individually Rational Payoff Constitutes an SPE Outcome
Proposition Any individually rational payoff can be supported as an SPE payoff for any δ ∈
(0,1).
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we deﬁne allocations for punishing more than two players by r jkl and r jklm.
Consider the following strategy proﬁle: (1) In the ﬁrst stage, a recognized proposer offers s,a n d
all the players accept it. (2) If there is a deviation from (1) by player j, the proposer chosen in the
next stage offers r j, and all the other players (including j) accept it. (2’) If there was a deviation
from (2) by player j, repeat (2). (2”) If there is a deviation from (2) by another player k, proposer
offers r jk, and all the other players (including j and k)a c c e p ti t .( 3 )I ft h e r ei sad e v i a t i o nf r o m( 2 ” )
by player j or k, repeat (2”). (3’) If there is a deviation from (3) by another player l, the proposer
offers r jkl, and all the other players (including j,k, and l) accept it. (4) For deviations by more
players, construct the rest of the strategy in the same way.
With this proﬁle, any deviation from this proﬁle results in the continuation payoff of zero for the
26deviating player, while no deviation always produces a non-negative payoff to the player. This does
not depend on what value δ takes. Thus, no faction cannot make itself strictly better off by deviation,
and s is sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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30Without individual mean std. dev. min max
n u m b e ro ff a c t i o n 8.43 2.02 5 12
faction size (total of LDP seats=1) 0.114 0.067 0.007 0.281
number of cabinet posts by a faction 2.57 2.11 0 9
size of prime minister’s faction 0.178 0.039 0.090 0.281
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
31(1) (2)
Likelihood 623.1997 622.9786
σ 377.6122 (25.8698) 377.5116
α -0.3572 (0.5592) 0.0000
δ 0.8060 (0.0488) 0.8056
Prime Minister 0.2630 (0.0529) 0.2594
Transport 0.0597 (0.0081) 0.0600
Construction 0.0583 (0.0102) 0.0587
Economic Planning 0.0532 (0.0094) 0.0533
Agriculture 0.0492 (0.0061) 0.0498
Defence 0.0460 (0.0071) 0.0461
Finance 0.0455 (0.0086) 0.0461
Labor 0.0433 (0.0072) 0.0428
International Trade and Industry 0.0409 (0.0076) 0.0411
Cabinet Secretary 0.0406 (0.0104) 0.0427
Health and Welfare 0.0397 (0.0070) 0.0399
Science and Technology 0.0378 (0.0083) 0.0379
Management and Coordination 0.0370 (0.0073) 0.0369
Home Aﬀairs 0.0340 (0.0116) 0.0344
Education 0.0340 (0.0080) 0.0333
Post and Telecomunication 0.0309 (0.0067) 0.0311
Foreign Aﬀairs 0.0281 (0.0067) 0.0275
Justice 0.0234 (0.0066) 0.0233
Hokkaido Development 0.0210 (0.0076) 0.0210
Public Safety 0.0144 (0.0115) 0.0147
Table 2: Estimates and Standard Errors. Standard Errors are in blackets. Ministers are in
the order of weight. Ministers with weights higher than the average weight (excluding the
Prime Minister) are in bold fonts. Column (2) corresponds to the case with the restriction
α =0 .
32Figure 1: Histogram of Faction Size
33Figure 2: Histogram of Factions of Prime Ministers
34Figure 3: Proportion of Cabinet posts and Faction Size. Lines are OLS ﬁtted lines for 1) Prime
Minister’s faction (line with steeper slope) and 2) factions without Prime Minister’s Posts.
35